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CONFLICTING .STATE AND FEDERAL CLAIMS OF TITLE
IN SUBMERGED LANDS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
THE Presidential veto of House Joint Resolution 225 to quitclaim to the
states title to lands below the tidewaters and navigable waters within their
boundaries,' and the subsequent failure of Congress to override the veto, 2
have shifted a vexed political question to the Supreme Court. Whether the
states or the Federal Government should control the disposition of the oil
resources under the continental shelf I within three miles of the West Coast
has been debated nine years in the legislative arena. 4 California, which has
leased some of the lands to oil operators since 1921,5 and the executive
branch of the Federal Government, which wants the lands as a naval petro-
leum reservation,8 will continue the dispute before the Court this term in an
original suit to quiet title to the lands off the coast.7 Although the suit osten-
sibly involves all "the lands, minerals, and other things of value underlying
the Pacific Ocean" three miles seaward from the California shore, and all the
relative rights of the Federal and state Governments and persons claiming
1. H. R. Doc. No. 765, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). In H. R. 225, "lands beneath
tidewaters and all lands beneath navigable waters, within the boundaries of each of the re-
spective states" included lands "oceanward to a line three geographical miles distant from
the coast line and to the boundary line of each respective state where in any case such
boundary line extends oceanward beyond three geographical miles."
2. N. Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1946, p. 2, col. 1.
3. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 FED. REG. 12303 (1945) claimed for the
United States the entire continental shelf contiguous to the coast. The continental shelf is
the extension of the land mass of the North American continent until a depth of about 600
feet is reached; off the Pacific Coast it extends a distance of from one to fifty miles. Ickes,
Underwater Wealth (Feb. 23, 1946) COLLIERS 20.
4. See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 208, 75th
Cong. 3d Sess. (1938); Hearings before Subcommittee 4 of the Committee on the Jiidiciary on
H. J. Res. 176 and H. J. Res. 181, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); Joint Hearings before the
House Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee of Senate Judiciary Committee ol H. J
Res. 225, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
on S. J. Res. 48 and H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
5. Cal. Stats, 1921, c. 829, §§ 1-5, held constitutional in Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal.
148, 273 Pac. 797 (1928), cert. denied sub. nom. Workman v. Boone, 280 U. S. 517 (1929).
"Whenever it appears to the (State Lands) commission that oil or gas deposits are known or
believed to be contained in any such lands and may be or are being drained by means of
wells upon adjacent lands, the commission shall thereupon be authorized and empowered
to lease any such lands ... " CAL. CODE (Deering, 1944) § 6872. See McGinty, Oil and
States' Rights (1946) 10 CURRENT HIsTORY 227.
6. Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. . Res. 48 and H. JA
Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 10; Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary
on S. J. Res. 208, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 34.
7. United States v. California, Sup. Ct., Original, No. 12, Oct. Term, 1945. Original
jurisdiction was invoked under U. S. CONsT., Art. III, § 2. A test case brought earlier
against the Pacific Western Oil Corp. in the Federal District Court in Los Angeles was dis-
missed and the present suit instituted to avoid delay in reaching the Supreme Court (1945)
14 U. S. L. WEEK 2248.
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under the state,8 the immediate issue is the disposition of the oil reserves.0
Whether the Court adopts a legalistic approach based on the title concept
or a functional approach looking toward use of the wealth within the dis-
puted lands, the decision will determine whether the citizens of California
or the citizens of all the states will receive the lessor's royalties for that oil.
Classing the submerged lands 10 under her marginal waters with those
under her inland navigable waters, California and other interested states u
trace title from the common law of England. For centuries the title to the
beds of navigable waters within the territory or jurisdiction of England was
owned by the crown as an incident of sovereignty, subject to the public
rights of fishing and navigation. 12 When the thirteen original colonies
achieved their independence from Great Britain, they themselves became
sovereign states, endowed with all the rights and prerogatives previously
belonging either to the king or to Parliament. Among the rights was the
absolute title to all navigable waters within the states and the soil under
them not previously granted away, to dispose of as they saw fit to private
individuals or to reserve to their own uses. 3 When these colonies entered
the Union, they surrendered only the attributes of sovereignty enumerated
8. The controversy between the Federal Government and California involves lands
"lying seaward of the ordinary low water mark on the coast of California and outside of the
inland waters of the state, extending seaward three nautical miles." See Complaint 6, 11,
United States v. California, Original, No. 12, Oct. Term, 1945. Applications to the Depart-
ment of Interior for leasing rights will also be affected by the decision. See Hearings before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 48 and H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946) 15, 242.
9. The possible impact on the law by future scientific development of ocean resources
is discussed infra, n. 86 and text.
10. The terms "submerged lands" and "tidelands" are not used with precise mednings
in most cases. Generally the former refers to lands below the line of mean low tide, the latter
to lands between mean low tide and mean high tide. See Ireland, 3Marginal Seas Around the
States (1940) 2 LA. L. REv. 252, 268.
11. The Attorneys General of 46 States, not including Washington and Arizona, signed
a "joint brief" supporting passage of H. J. Res. 225 to quitclaim title to the states, and
eighteen resolutions substantially identical to H. J. Res. 225 were introduced at the same
time by representatives from California, Nevada, Alabama, New York, Ohio, Illinois,
Mississippi, and Maine; Joint Hearings of the House Committee on the Judiciary and Sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)
12-18. Subsequently the Attorneys General of Missouri and Georgia were reported to have
withdrawn their support; Hearings before the Commitlee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 48 and
H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 8.
12. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 11 (1894); Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18
Wall. 57, 65 (U. S. 1873).
13. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U. S. 364 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S.
1, 14 (1894); Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423, 436 (U. S. 1867); Den v. Jersey Co., 15
How. 426,433 (U. S. 1853); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 229 (U. S. 1845); Martin
v. Waddell's Lessee, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (U. S. 1842).
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in the Constitution, reserving to themselves title to their submerged lands.14
New states were admitted to the Union "on an equal footing with the
original states in all respects whatever." 11 Where prior to the state's admis-
sion the United States had acquired the territory by purchase or cession,
title to land under inland navigable waters has been deemed to have been
held by the United States in trust for the future states.1 Although in ad-
mitting new states the Federal Government reserved to itself as public lands
title to "waste and unappropriated lands" within their territory,"7 the navi-
gable inland waters and soils under them were not considered public lands;
the new states were held to have the "same rights, sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion over this subject as the original states." I California, like other states,
has accordingly patented, deeded and leased submerged inland soils since
entry into the Union. 9 In reliance on the state's title, extensive develop-
ment of bays, harbors and rivers has taken place, both by the state and by
private owners. 21
So much of the state's position as applies to inland waters is undisputed.
Proponents of the state's title also maintain that within the territorial limits
of states generally recognized by the law of nations, a state can define its
boundaries upon the sea.2' By its Constitution California has asserted that
14. See cases cited supra note 13.
15. The condition of equality was apparently first legislated in the Ordinance for the
Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, passed by
the Congress of the Confederation, 1787, readopted by 1st Cong., 1st Sess.; 1 STAT. 51
(1789). The statutes admitting subsequent states have contained nearly identical phrase.
ology, e.g., 9 STAT. 452 (1850) (California); 3 STAT. 489 (1819) (Alabama); 2 STAT. 701 (1812)
(Louisiana).
16. See Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 15 (1935); United States v. Mission
Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391,404 (1903); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U. S. 161,183
(1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 26 (1893); San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 656,
670 (1891); Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423,436 (U. S. 1867); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
3 How. 212, 224 (U. S. 1845); United States v. Ashton, 170 Fed. 509, 513 (C. C. W. D. Wash.
1909).
17. "The people inhabiting the said Territory do agree and declare that they will for-
ever disclaim all right and title to the waste or unappropriated lands lying within the said
Territory," 3 STAT. 489, 492 (1819) (Alabama). Variations of this formula are found in the
acts admitting the other new states with the exception of Texas. See note 49, infra.
18. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 230 (U. S. 1845). See also cases cited supra
note 16. But see Case v. Toftus, 39 Fed. 730 (C. C. D. Ore. 1889).
19. "The decisions . . . have become . . . the foundation of many titles," United
States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391,'406 (1903). See Field, J., concurring in Knight v.
U. S. Land Ass'n, 142 U. S. 161, 189 (1891).
20. Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 48 and . J.
Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 61.
21. Manchester v. Mass., 139 U. S. 240, 264 (1891); United States v. Newark Meadows
Imp. Co., 173 Fed. 426, 429 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909); Humbolt Lumber Manufacturers
Ass'n v. Christopherson, 73 Fed. 239, 244 (C. C. A. 9th, 1896). On the theory of obsoleteness
of the three-mile rule and to protect state interests Louisiana in 1939 passed a statute extend-
ing her boundary into the Gulf of Mexico 27 miles. See Loret, Louisiana's 27 Mile Mariltno
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its boundary extends three miles over the ocean from the line of mean low
tide.2 2 Accordingly, California claims that the open sea within this three-
mile limit is part of the state's navigable waters, and hence the soil and the
minerals beneath these waters belong to the state, and have been recognized
as so belonging by various acts of the Federal Government.2 This argu-
ment denies that a distinction exists or has been enunciated in past cases
between a state's navigable inland waters and the navigable -aters of the
open sea along the coast.2 4 Accordingly, an adjudication that title to the
continental shelf belonged to the United States would cloud the title to all
land beneath inland waters by overthrowing a line of decisions a century
old.25
Clearly, where the states' titles derive from the common law sovereignty
of the king, they can claim no more than the king claimed at the date of the
Revolution when the colonies acquired his rights. While for centuries the
territory of England has been considered to include lands under tidal rivers,
landlocked bays, and harbors which are under the jurisdiction of the littoral
counties, 26 the boundaries of the counties stop at the coastY2 The coastal
land between mean high tide and mean low tide vests in the crown. -3 But the
Belt (1939) 13 TuLANE L. REV. 253. But see Legis. (1939) 39 COL. L. Rlv. 317, denying the
power of the State so to extend its boundary without consent of Congress, but assuming that
the bed of the Gulf within the three-mile limit is owned by Louisiana. In September, 1945,
Louisiana leased 129,025 acres of shallow water extending 30 miles from the coast to the
Magnolia Oil Co., an action which might lead to judicial test of this law. Coastal Drilling
(Sept. 15, 1945) BusLNEss WVEEK 35.
22. CAL. ConsT. (1849) Art. XII, § 1; id. (1879) Art. XXI, § 1. "The boundary of the
State of California shall be as follows: . . . west . . . to the Pacific Ocean, and extending
therein three English miles; thence, running in a Northwesterly direction and following the
direction of the Pacific Coast. . . ." Congress in admitting California with this boundary
can be considered to have ratified state jurisdiction out to this boundary. See Humbolt
Lumber Manufacturers Ass'n v. Christopherson, 73 Fed. 239 (C. C. A. 9th, 1896). This
would no more constitute a recognition of state title in the land out to that boundary, how-
ever, than Congressional enactments concerning a Federal three-mile or other limit would
constitute a recognition of Federal title within those limits. See discussion infra, p. 364.
23. Answer, United States v. California, Sup. Ct. Original, No. 12, Oct. Term, 1945,
89 et seg. Such acts include acceptance by the executive branch of the federal government
.of state grants for military or naval reservations containing some lands under submerged
waters and previous statements by federal officers, e.g., letter of H. L. Ickes, Secretary of
Interior, to Olin S. Procter (1933) refusing federal license to drill for oil in offshore lands,
Hearings before Subcommittee 4 of the Commitee on the Judiciary on H. J. Res. 176, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939) 172.
24. See discussion infra, p. 363.
25. Hearings before te Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 48 and H. J.
Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 311.
26. Queen v. Keyn, L. R. 2 Ex. 63, 162, 195 (Ex. 1876).
27. Id. at 162.
28. Id. at 199. HALE, DE JuRN MARs (Circ. 1666) published in S. A. MooRE, Hislony
OF T=E FoRnsnoRE (3d ed. 1888) 378. MOORE, id. at 638-63, maintains that while the prop-
osition was anciently true, the crown long since granted away this fee.
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title to submerged coastal lands below mean low tide has even in this century
been regarded by the British judiciary as an unsettled question. 9
The concept of a three-mile limit did not appear in English law before
1800, and then its application was confined to neutral waters in time of war. 0
In the leading British case on sovereignty over marginal seas, Queen v.
Keyn,31 decided a hundred years after the states asserted their independence,
thirteen justices expressed almost that many views on whether the jurisdic-
tion of England extended three miles to sea for the limited purpose of making
the criminal laws apply to foreigners in that area. In an exhaustive discus-
sion of sovereignty in coastal waters, Chief Justice Cockburn, holding with
the majority of seven that jurisdiction could not apply, wrote of the three-
mile limit: "To this hour it has not, even in theory, settled into certainty.
For centuries before it was thought of, the great landmarks of our judicial
system had been set fast-the jurisdiction of the common law over the land
and inland waters contained within it, forming together the realm of Eng-
land, that of the admiral over English vessels on the seas, the common prop-
erty or highway of mankind." 32
In a dictum in the same case the court considered a problem closely analo-
gous to the oil deposits of the continental shelf. Title to certain coal mines
extending below the bed of the ocean beyond low-water mark had been
vested in Queen Victoria by a special act of Parliament.33 Denying that this
act indicated that "Parliament was asserting the right of the crown to the
bed of the sea over the three-mile distance," Chief Justice Cockburn main-
tained it was merely "settling a dispute as to the specific mines . .,. in
question." 34 The relatively recent appearance of the three-mile limit in
English law, the distinction between inland and coastal waters, and the
denial of the crown's general title to submerged lands under coastal waters
all negate California's contention that title to the disputed lands was an
incident of royal sovereignty when the original colonies acquired the crown's
rights.
The large number of Supreme Court cases frequently cited as holding
directly or inferentially that title is in the states 35 are not conclusive as to
29. Att'y General for British Columbia v. Att'y General for Canada (1914) A. C. 153,
174 (P. C. 1913).
30. The Twee Gebroeders, 3 C. Rob. Adm. & Eccl. 162 (Adm. 1800), 336 (Adm. 1801);
The Anna, 5 C. Rob. Adm. & Eccl. 373 (Adm. 1805).
31. L. R. 2 Ex. 63 (Ex. 1876).
32. Id. at 194-95.
33. Cornwall Submarine Mines Act, 1858, 21 & 22 VICT., c. 109.
34. See note 31 supra, at 202.
35. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (U. S. 1845) (Mobile Bay); Goodtitle v.
Kibbe, 9 How. 470 (U. S. 1850) (Alabama, navigable tidewater river); Smith v. Maryland,
18"How. 71 (U. S. 1855) (Chesapeake Bay); Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57
(U. S. 1873) (San Francisco Bay); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 (1876) (Mississippi
River); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1876) (Ware River, Virginia); Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240 (1891) (Buzzard's Bay); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S, 371
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the submerged lands of the marginal belt. It is true that the opinions abound
with such dogma as "each State owns the beds of all the tide-waters within
its jurisdiction" " or "the navigable waters and the soils under the same." 0
That such generalizations are more convenient than accurate, however, can
be seen from an examination of the facts of the cases in which they are as-
serted. Invariably the submerged land in question has been beneath bay,
harbor, river, lake or other inland body of water.3i The leading case of
Manchester v. 1M1assachusetts,19 often cited as indicating state control over
three miles of the open sea, involved regulation of fishing in those waters by
a state statute passed in the exercise of the police powers; furthermore, the
court expressly disclaimed passing judgment over the relative rights of the
federal and state governments. The only case directly involving competing
rights in the open sea, The Abby Dodge,40 arose from a challenged federal
statute regulating sponge fishing in the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of
Florida. In a decision again apparently based upon the police power, the
Court upheld the statute as an exercise of Congress' power over foreign com-
merce, but construed it not to apply to waters within the state territory,
where the state powers of regulation were deemed exclusive. There is a clear
distinction between the exercise of police power over a given jurisdiction and
a proprietary right of land in that jurisdiction.4 '
California's claim also has been bottomed on the theory that the sub-
merged lands were held in trust for the future state after their acquisition by
the United States from Mexico in 1848.42 This trust doctrine was first enun-
ciated in the case of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,43 which involved a title dis-
(1891) (Illinois, inland lake); San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138 U. S. 656 (1891) (San Francisco
Bay); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U. S. 161 (1891) (San Francisco Bay);
Illinois Cent., R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 (1892) (Lake Michigan); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U. S. 1 (1894) (Columbia River); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water
Comrm'rs, 168 U. S. 349 (1897) (Mississippi River); Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile,
187 U. S. 479 (1903) (Mobile River); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391
(1903) (San Francisco Bay); The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166 (1912) (Gulf of Mexico and
Straits of Florida); Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251 (1915) (Eliza-
beth River, Virginia); Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. R., 255 U. S. 56 (1921) (Seattle
Harbor); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574 (1922) (Red River); Massachusetts v. New
York, 271 U. S. 65 (1926) (Lake Ontario); United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64 (1931) (Green,
Colorado and San Juan Rivers); United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1 (1935) (Inland non-
navigable lakes, Oregon); Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10 (1935) (San Pedro Bay);
United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U. S. 501 (1938) (San Francisco Bay).
36. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 394 (1876).
37. Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423,436 (U. S. 1867).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. 139 U. S. 240 (1891).
40. 223 U. S. 166 (1912).
41. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389,404 (1917).
42. The territory which now comprises California uwas part of the land ceded to the
United States by the Treaty of Guadalajara which ended the Mexican War. 9 STAT. 922
(1848).
43. 3 How. 212 (U. S. 1845).
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pute to reclaimed lands in Mobile Bay. The court there held that despite
the reservation of all "waste and unappropriated land" to the United States
as public land in the Act which admitted Alabama as a state, 44 the lands in
question were not public land. Alabama, the Court reasoned, was admitted
on an equal footing with the original states. Part of this equality was owner-
ship of submerged lands in the same degree as the original states. During
the period when Alabama was a territory, the submerged lands had been
held in trust for the state, and could not have been granted away by Con-
gress. Significantly, the dissenting judge denied the validity of the distinc-
tion between submerged land and dry land applied to "waste and unappro-
priated" land reserved as public land. He maintained that equality was a
political matter, and regretted the introduction of the new idea of proprie-
tary equality which reversed previous cases.
45
Whatever the merit of the distinction between dry and submerged waste
lands, however, it has never been specifically applied to the lands under the
open sea. Without clouding any of the numerous titles to lands under inland
waters based on state title as a rule of law or overruling the cases following
the state title doctrines, the Supreme Court could deny that California ac-
quired the tidelands off its shore from any trust of the Federal Government
as part of its admission to the union on an equal footing. Furthermore, tlfere
is nothing about the trust concept itself which indicates whether it should
apply to the open sea or be limited to inland waters. Conceding that some
lands were held in trust, the assumption that the lands in question were or
were not among them is no more than a statement of a conclusion.
II
From a determination of the weakness of the State's claim to title to the
three-mile belt of the continental shelf, however, it does not necessarily fol-
low that the fee has always been in the Federal Government. The constitu-
tional power to acquire such a fee is unquestioned, under Congress' power
"to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." 41 The power
of the executive and legislative branches of Federal Government to acquire
new territory has been upheld, 4 but the manner in which federal title may
be asserted is an open question. 48 With regard to the coastal belt, the sim-
plest explanation, which distinguishes the thirteen original colonies and
44. 3 STAT. 489, 492 (1819).
45. See note 43 supra, at 235.
46. U. S. CONST., Art. IV, § 3.
47. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24 (1907).
* 48. The Navy Department at one time sought to persuade Congress to appropriate the
oil deposits without compensation as an exercise of its control over navigable waters through
its commerce power, dominant over any qualified title of the States, on the theory that the
oil was necessary to the Navy, which aided navigation; Hearings before the House Committee
on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 208, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 54. See Greenleaf Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251, 273 (1915); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs,
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Texas from California and the other states,49 is that the lands in question
were public lands reserved to the Federal Government. The United States
acquired all the territory of California by treaty of cession with Mexico in
1848,50 and California was later admitted to the Union under an express
reservation of title to the United States of all public lands.51 Admission on
an equal footing could imply equality in sovereign political power without
equality to title in lands.52 Advocates of this explanation maintain that the
lands in question were at the time of California's admission waste and un-
appropriated and hence reserved to the United States, and that they have
never since been granted to California.
5 3
However, not only is this explanation unsupported by any previous cases,
but its proponents must also ignore the "trust" doctrine established in the
Pollard case for inland waters. There was no less reason in 1850 for describ-
ing the lands under San Francisco Bay as waste and unappropriated than
there was for so describing the lands now in question; yet the former have
been held to have passed to the state.54 A distinction between the inland
waters and those of the open sea within California's boundaries, if it is to be
drawn, cannot be founded solely on the general conception of public lands.
Unless such a distinction is drawn, the proponents of the state's claim are
correct in assserting that the assumption that these lands are public lands
would cloud innumerable titles. Inland states admitted to the Union under
similar provisions would be affected as well as coastal ones.
Neither can such a distinction be found in any previous American cases.
229 U. S. 82, 87 (1913); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53,
62 (1913); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 634 (1912); Scranton v. Wheeler,
179 U. S. 141, 162 (1900); Bailey and Fulgham v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 77 (1926), cert.
denied, 273 U. S. 751 (1927); Hawkins Point Lighthouse Case, 39 Fed. 77, 87 (C. C. D. Md.
1889); Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. Ry., 32 Fed. 9, 20 (C. C. D. N. J. 1887). The tenuous
relation of an easement for navigation and title in the oil deposits has apparently led the
Navy to abandon this thesis. At present it takes no position as to the land or the pending
suit; communication to YALE L. J. from Office of the Judge Advocate General, Navy Dep't,
Aug. 27, 1946.
49. Texas is classed with the original thirteen states because prior to its entry in the
Union it was a sovereign independent nation, and the annexation expressly provideq that it
should "retain all the vacant and unappropriated lands lying vithin its limits"; 5 Sr,T.
798 (1845). See Ireland, Marginal Seas Around the States (1940) 2 L,%. L. Rnv. 252, 271.
50. 9 STAT. 926 (1848).
51. 9 STAT. 452 (1850).
52. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 230 (U. S. 1845) (dissenting opinion);
Case v. Toftus, 39 Fed. 730 (C. C. D. Ore. 1889).
53. Hearings before the Senate Committee on 11w Judiciary on S. J. Res. 48 and H. J.
Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 19; Joint Hearings before the House Committee on 1h
Judiciary and Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945) 125.
54. The term "public lands" does not include tide lands. Mann v. Tacoma Land Co.,
153 U. S. 273, 284 (1894); San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 656 (1891); Knight v. United
States Land Ass'n, 142 U. S. 161 (1891); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391
(1903); United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U. S. 501 (1938).
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As indicated above, none of the cases decided by the Supreme Court apply
to proprietary rights in the continental shelf. Where a consideration of the
open sea was not before the Court, there was no reason for it to draw such a
distinction. But though cases applying only to inland waters may not bind
the court's determination of title in the land beneath the open seas, never-
theless the generalness of the language employed indicates that no distinc-
tion existed in the minds of the judges.55 Therefore, while those cases do not
indicate that title was in the states, neither can they be used to show that in
1850 it was in the United States. Failing such a demonstration, the "public
land" theory of title collapses.
Another theory, denying any ownership of lands underlying the three-
mile limit at the time of the Revolution, maintains that, "As rights in the
three-mile belt, susceptible of possession and ownership, began to emerge
subsequently, they emerged as property of the national sovereign, whose
function it is to establish and vindicate those rights against the possible
claims of other nations." 56 The reasoning is not based on a distinction
between the original states and the others. It would admit that title to the
beds of inland waters of California can be traced from the crown, and escape
the problem of whether the admission of new states on an equal footing with
the old implies a proprietary as well as political sovereignty. Previous cases
based on proprietary equality, as they all involve inland waters, could not
be applicable.
As there are according to this theory admittedly no American cases set-
tling ownership of the three-mile belt of the open sea, its legal justification
must be found in more general concepts of sovereignty announced in Ameri-
can cases, or in the cases of other nations or the customs of international law
as indicated by writers on the subject. Granting the principle that the de-
fense of American rights in these lands against possible claims of other na-
tions is an attribute of "external sovereignty" vested in the federal govern-
ment rather than the states, it does not necessarily follow that ownership,
too, vests in the Federal Government. It would be as logical to say that to
exercise its powers of national defense or of regulation of commerce, the
Federal Government needed a proprietary interest in the whole country.
As for'cases from other nations, it is true that courts have held pearl and
chank beds,5 8 oyster beds, 59 sponges 10 and coal,61 on or under the sea's floor
55. Since the continental shelf was not under consideration in these cases, the lack of
distinction and generalness of language are of as little guiding value in this case as wag the
common law property doctrine of "ad inferos, ad coelus" when airplanes began using the
sky over private property.
56. Motion for Leave to File Complaint, 2-4, United States v. California, Sup. Ct.,
No. 12, Original, Oct. Term, 1945.
57. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 315 (1936).
58. Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal, 27 Indian L. R. (Madras Ser.) 551 (1904), dis-
cussed in Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea? (1924) 4 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L, 34, 41,
59. Sea Fisheries Act, 1868, 31 & 32 VIcT. c. 45, § 67. See Hurst, id, at 40.
60. See Hurst, ibid.
61. Lord Advocate v. Wemyss [1900] A. C. 48 (H. L. 1899).
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and within and without a three-mile limit, to be controlled by the littoral
nation under theories of occupation, prescription, or acquiescence of other
nations. It is believed, however, that these foreign cases can be of little
guiding value. Control in these cases seems to manifest a nation's regulatory
power rather than its proprietary right. Furthermore, conflicts between in-
dividuals and nations will supply no analogy to the problem of dual sov-
ereignty of the states and the United States.
Nor do the concepts of the three-mile limit and the marginal belt in inter-
national law shed much light on the present controversy. The early "extrav-
agant pretensions" of various maritime powers of sovereignty over great
expanses of ocean 12 were replaced in the 17th century by the concept of
freedom of the seas.61 Its corollary was common ownership among all na-
tions of the highway of the world.6 4 The need of individual nations for self-
protection, 5 however, qualified those concepts with the idea of a marginal
belt over which a state could exert exclusive control because of its power to
do so.66 Control was originally conceived in terms of cannon range as one
marine league or three English miles.7 The views of writers on the law of
nations, slowly adopted as law or policy by the nations themselves, were,
however, almost as honored in the breach as the observance.
The first application of the three-mile limit in law was with regard to im-
munity from seizure in war time of belligerent vessels in the coastal waters
of neutral countries. s This use of the rule was consonant with its basis of
the self-protection of the state. Where the problem was protecting the state
62. Queen v. Keyn, L. R. 2 Ex. 63, 175 (Ex. 1876). SELDEN, ML%,r CLASuM- (Howell's
trans. 1663) 459; HALE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 400. The day of "extravagant pretensions"
may be returning. See Clark and Renner, life Should Annex 50,000,000 Square Miles of
Ocean (May 4, 1946) 218 SAT. EVE-TING POST 16. 92, 95, advocating drastic extension of
exclusive control over large areas of ocean as a defense measure for atomic w%-ars, apparently
ignoring the effect of such a move on the concept of freedom of the seas. An official step
towards reasserting these ancient doctrines might be implied from the Presidential Prozla-
mation claiming the entire continental shelf, note 73 infra, although the aim of the Proclama-
tion to conserve resources is completely different from the 17th century attempts to control
commerce.
63. MEYER, THE EXTENT OF JURISDICTION IN COASTAL W,ATERS (1937) 4; FULTON,
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA (1911) 4-S.
64. GRorius, MARE LIBERUM (Magoffin's trans. 1916) 36.
65. JEssuP, THE LAW OF TERRITORLN VATERS AND MARITIME JURIsDIcTIOx (1927) S.
66. BYxKERSHOEE, DE Domxio MArIs DiSSERTATio (2d ed. 1744; Magoffin's trans.
1923) 44.
67. BYNKERsHoEK, ibid. introduced the concept of cannon range. Galiani, an Italian
jurist, first translated this as three miles; JEssuP, op. cit. supra note 65, at 6; FULTON, op. cd.
supra note 63, at 563. For the first appearance of the three-mile rule in American law, see
Letter of Sec'y of State Jefferson to the British Minister, Nov. 8, 1793, quoted in CR0oCsP,,
THE EXTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA (1919) 636.
68. TheAnn, 1 Fed. Cas. 926, 929, No. 937 (C. C. D. Mass. 1812); The Twee Gebroed-
ers, 3 C. Rob. Adm. & Eccl. 162 (Adm. 1800), 336 (Adm. 1801); The Anna, 5 C. Rob. Adm.
& Eccl. 373 (Adm. 1805).
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against smuggling or by quarantine laws, however, both England 19 and the
United States 0 have found it practical at times to deviate from a three-mile
limit, either by law or treaty. On a nation's right to absolute control over
navigation in a three-mile limit, there has been little dispute." Where na-
tions have conflicted over fishing rights on the other hand, maritime powers
have been reluctant to confine their claims of an area exclusively reserved to
their citizens to three miles. 2 Even the application of the concept in this
field has been based more on a municipal power to regulate and conserve
fishing within certain jurisdictions than on a proprietary attitude toward
the fish, which are considered unowned until caught. 3 It thus far appears
that, while international jurists have not distinguished control over the
marginal belt from ownership in it, the claims of nations for the limited pur-
poses for which a belt has been recognized have been conceived with the
former in view.
It should be noted, however, that even for those purposes enumerated, a
three-mile limit has never been accepted by all maritime nations. 4 A con-
ference at The Hague in 1930 for the codification of international law failed
to reach any international agreement on the extent of territorial waters.
Nations have tended to expand their claims over marginal waters, partly
rationalizing on the obsolescence of a rule based on the cannon range of a
hundred years ago.78 Although the amount of recognition the three-mile
rule achieved has been attributed largely to the backing it has had from the
United States and Great Britain, the United States has been said "more
than any other power [to have] varied her principles and claims as to the
69. 6 GEo. IV, c. 78 (1825) (quarantine, two leagues); 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 52-4 (1833)
(customs, four leagues); 16 & 17 VIt. c. 107, §§ 212, 218 (1853) (customs, one to eight
leagues); 39 & 40 VICT. c. 36, § 179 (1876) (customs, one to three leagues).
70. Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, 234 (U. S. 1804) (legality of seizure of American
ship engaged in illicit trade four leagues off Brazilian coast). REV. STAT. §§ 2760, 2867,
2868, 2872-4 (1878); 14 U. S. C. § 66 (1940); 19 U. S. C. § 267 (1940). See CRocXER, op. cit.
supra note 67, at 630-94. For Anglo-American Liquor Treaties, Treaty Ser. No. 22 (1924),
see JEssur, op. cit. supra note 65, at 279-317.
71. 1 0PPENHEIm, INTERNATiONAL LAW (5th ed. 1937) 387.
72. MEYER, op. cit.'supra note 63 passim; FULTON, op. cit supra note 63 passim.
73. Thompson v. Dana, 52 F. (2d) 759 (D. Ore. 1931), aff'd per curiam, 285 U. S. 529
(1932). The regulatory rather than proprietary attitude seems to apply to sedentary fisheries
also, since they are free to whoever chooses to use them so long as he conforms with conserva-
tion regulations. But see Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (U. S. 1855) (Maryland oyster
regulation upheld on ground state owns soil in trust for private fishing rights); McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1876) (Virginia statute restricting oyster planting in Virginia watersl
to Virginia citizens upheld).
74. Advocates of limits other than three miles have been Italy, Russia, Norway,
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. See MEYER, op. cit.
supra note 63, at 514; JEssup, op. cit. supra note 65, at 62-66.
75. See Territorial Waters (1930) 74 SOLICITOR'S J. 311.
76, FULTON, op. cit. supra note 63, at 681-9; HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1917)
157.
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extent of territorial waters according to her policy at the time." I Recently
this country abandoned all adherence to such a limit when a Presidential
Proclamation 7 8 claimed control of the entire continental shelf and the waters
over it, extending from one to 250 miles from the coast.
Several conclusions have been drawn from this fluid state of intdrnational
law regarding the marginal belt. First is that the three-mile limit, though
perhaps the "ordinary limit," is not the only one enforced, and that the
boundary of a nation's jurisdiction for one purpose need not be the boundary
for all purposes. ° Second is that such a limit is not international law at all
but national propaganda and policy. A nation can establish and change its
boundary at will for any particular purpose,81 subject to its power to enforce
its policy and the power or inclination of other nations to oppose it0 2 Finally,
since the right to withdraw minerals from under the bottom of the sea has
never been the subject of conflicting national claims, it appears not to have
been one of the purposes for which a claim over marginal seas has heretofore
been exerted.
I
The foregoing legalistic examination of title to submerged lands indicates
that there is no settled law which the Court need consider binding with
regard to the lands in question. Neither national, foreign, nor international
law has dealt with the specific problem of oil, and no rigid title concept
blocks a fresh approach. It would thus seem both legally feasible and practi-
cal to deal with the problem de noo in light of policy considerations.
As yet, however, no clear policy has been established to serve as guide to
the Court, which has tended in recent years to emphasize that formulation
of policy should be a function of the political branches of the government,
and that the judiciary's role should be limited to implementation. This
tendency to eschew political issues has been expressed specifically in a re-
luctance to interfere where Congressional action involving questions of
public domain was concerned. 3
The desirability of a legislative rather than judicial determination of
77. FULTON, op. cit. supra note 63, at 650. But see JEssup, op. cit. supra note 65, at 49.
78. Proclamation No. 2667, Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 FED. REG. 12303, 12305 (1945).
79. See Ickes, Underweater Wealth (Feb. 23, 1946) COLLIERS 20.
80. FULTON, op. cit. supra note 63, at 663-4; 1 OPPENaEan , op. cit. supra note 71, at
389-92.
81. Borchard, Resources of the Coniinental Shelf (1946) 40 Aix. J. Ii.. L. 53; Bingham,
The Continental Sh4f and the Marginal Belt (1946) 40 Am. J. Is-r. L. 173; H,%LL, loc. cit. supra
note 76.
82. For an example of the power of other nations to oppose an extension of sovereignty,
see the Bering Sea controversy. When English ships w,'ere seized for violating a federal
statute controlling seal hunting throughout the entire Bering Sea, the Supreme Court refused
to interfere with the extension of sovereignty, In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472 (1892), and Great
Britain successfully opposed the American claim in an arbitration tribunal. See CRocimn,
op. cit. supra note 67, at 676; JEsSUP, op. cit. supra note 65, at 54-56.
83. United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 30 (1940); Van
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policy is heightened in the instant case by the Presidential Proclamation
which claimed title to the entire continental shelf for the United States, sub-
ject to whatever claims of the States the courts might allow.84 By excursion
into what promises to be a new era in international law of the seas, the execu-
tive department would seem to have indicated the need for a realistic deter-
mination of the relation of ownership of all the submerged land of the shelf
to that of land within the three-mile limit. While oil deposits which follow
no arbitrary boundary lines 85 are the immediate issue in the case, science is
only beginning to tap other resources which the sea and its floor have to ofter.
Techniques of obtaining power from ocean currents, extracting minerals
other than oil from the ocean and its subsoil, and using marine agriculture
are scientific developments yet in infancy. Military considerations of
defense also demand a new evaluation of the concepts of territorial waters 87
and perhaps a revision of the extent of recognition of freedom of the seas.
What weight should be given these vaguely discernible potentialities, and
whether vesting coastal title in the states is wise in view of the broad scale on
which a future generation may desire to develop the continental shelf, is a
question for the makers, not the juridical executors, of national policy. If
the Court declares title to be in California, Congress would be deprived of
the opportunity to exercise its will and to take into consideration the broad
policy questions.
The legal foundation on which the Supreme Court could leave the question
open to a policy decision by Congress could begin with a declaration that the
disputed lands have been, as part of the bed of the sea, the unoccupied com-
mon lands of all nations, with title in none. Thereafter, the Court could
reason that an undisputed attribute of sovereignty is the power to acquire
title to unoccupied land,88 but that the acquisition of new territory, as it in-
volves the rights of and relations with foreign nations, is only within the
power of the national sovereign and not of the states.89 The executive and
legislative departments, however, and not the courts, declare such an ex-
tension of sovereignty."0 Congress has taken no final action regarding the
Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 168 (1886); Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States,
107 F. (2d) 402, 409 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 654 (1940).
84. See note 78 supra.
85. "What complicates the question is the fact that oil deposits know no boundaries
such as the three-mile limit, hence wells may tap pools which extend well beyond not only
the low-tide mark but even the three-mile limit." Ickes, supra note 79, at 48.
86. See Clark and Renner, oc. cit. supra note 62.
87. Ibid.
88. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212 (1890). See Johnson v. McIntosh, 8
Wheat. 543, 595 (U. S. 1823). 1 OPI"ENHEim, op. cit. supra note 71, at 437.
89. ". '. . the discovery is made for the whole nation . . . the vacant soil is to be~dis-
posed of by that organ of the government which has the constitutional power to dispose of
the national domains ... " Marshall, C. J. in Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 595
(U. S. 1823).
90. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 32 (1907); In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 503 (1892);
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212 (1890); United States v. The Kodial., 53 Fed. 126
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disputed lands. The Court could therefore consider the Presidential Procla-
mation as for the first time vesting title to the whole coAtinental shelf, includ-
ing that portion within the three-mile limit, in the Federal Government.
This conclusion would avoid the palpable fiction of maintaining that title
had vested during the long period when the lands were considered valueless
and claimed by no one.
Where the Federal Government has through executive action acquired fee
to new lands, it is still the duty of Congress to make "all needful Rules and
Regulations" respecting them.9 In this case it could, if it deems wise, dis-
pose of them to the littoral states.
Congress, in formulating policy regarding these lands, could at the same
time dispose of subsidiary issues which have been raised by both sides and
which are more suited to legislative than judicial handling. Proponents of
Federal title, for example, have contended that the last great unexploited
reservoir of natural petroleum must be conserved for national defense 0 2 and
that California, which has its own conservation laws 93 but is not a member
of the interstate compact for proration of oil,94 may be tempted to give as
much weight to present royalties as to future security. These would seem to
be matters for the consideration of the body constitutionally charged with
responsibility for national defense 9 rather than the Court.
Proponents of the state's point of view, on the other hand, have empha-
sized the danger to interests other than oil 11 in a holding favorable to the
United States, conceivably with the aim of distracting attention from the
oil itself. 7 The Court's decision based on a distinction between the open sea
and inland waters would not affect the titles on which port and harbor au-
thorities rely. Nevertheless, Congress as a representative body would be
empowered and could be expected to protect the few claims of its constitu-
ents existing in the open sea "in good faith reliance on the state's claim of
ownership." 98
(D. C. D. Alaska, 1892); United States v. The James G. Swan, 50 Fed. 103 (D. C. D. Wash.
1892).
91. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 3.
92. See note 6 supra.
93. CAL. CODE (Deering, 1944) §§ 3000-3433.
94. 49 STAT. 939 (1935); 50 STAT. 617 (1937); 53 STAT. 1071 (1939); 55 SrTA. 666 (1941);
57 STAT. 383 (1943). See Colby, The Law of Oil and Gas (1942) 30 CALU'. L. REv. 245,268-9.
95. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. Note that even if the Court declared tide to be in the
state, Congress could acquire this land for national defense under its right of eminent do-
main; in such an event, however, the state would be paid compensation. James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937); Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367,374 (1875).
96. The American Association of Port Authorities, for example, have been among the
many opponents of record of the Federal Government's claim on the ground that it "creates
an atmosphere of doubt and confusion with respect to the title" to submerged and reclaimed
lands in ports and harbors. Hearings before the Sealte Commillee on the Judiciary on S. J.
Res. 48 and H. J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 222.
97. Id. at 12.
98. Id. at 10. The Department of Interior has recommended that Congress pass relief
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It is submitted that a holding by the Supreme Court that the lands in dis-
pute have been unoccupied lands in which no title vested until the recent
Presidential Proclamation is in accord with reason and sound policy con-
siderations. The representative body would thus be enabled to formulate a
policy which would protect national and state interests and relate the prob-
lem of the lands in issue realistically to the whole problem of the continental
shelf. The Court should allow Congress to dispose of the matter, undis-
tracted by legalisms of title and addressing itself to the basic questions in-
volved.
legislation in the event that the Supreme Court decide that the United States owns the
lands, which would protect ;'the States concerned and those who have operated under State
law" from "any liability for damage in trespass for any past development of the submerged
land" and would protect "structures, such as docks and piers, which may have been erected
on the submerged lands and the surface ownership of filled-in areas . . . if they were
created or filled in accordance with the Federal or State law." Ibid. Following the with-
drawal of oil lands from prospecting by President Taft in 1909, Congress passed legislation
to save from injury those who already had substantial investments in the withdrawn land,
36 STAT. 847 (1910), 43 U. S. C. § 142 (1940); 36 STAT. 1015 (1911), 30 U. S. C. § 103 (1940);
38 STAT. 708 (1914), 30 U. S. C. § 104 (1940). See Colby, supra note 94, at 255-9.
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